Despite the debate, my reading of the literature up to that point was that there was a significant amount of consensus around multipliers being around or slightly above 1.
As soon as the 2008 crisis started the debate went from a simple academic discussion to an urgent policy issue. What will be the impact of fiscal stimulus? The Obama administration produced a report (co-authored by Christina Romer) that suggested multipliers around 1.5 to justify the need for fiscal policy stimulus. These multipliers were criticized by those who believed that there is no room for aggregate demand management even in the presence of a large crisis. Since then the debate has become much more ideological than academic. We have had a series of additional academic papers that, if any, suggest that multipliers are even larger than the initial estimates because of the special circumstances we are in (monetary policy stuck at the zero-lower bound and a deep recession caused by develeraging forces that reduce private demand).
But these new (and old) academic results have simply be displaced by the ideological debate that followed the fiscal policy stimulus of the 2008-2009 period, which somehow led to the conclusion that those policies did not work and that what we now needed was more austerity. And when over the last two years we forecasted GDP growth rates in the face of coordinated austerity by many governments we somehow forgot to consider that multipliers can be large.Ideologische Antikeynesianer unterschätzen hin und wieder gern keynesianische Effekte. Und wenn keynesianische Effekte da sein sollen, dann gerade in Zeiten höher Unsicherheit und tiefen Rezessionen. Der IMF schreibt:
This (...) sheds light on these issues using international evidence. The main finding, based on data for 28 economies, is that the multipliers used in generating growth forecasts have been systematically too low since the start of the Great Recession, by 0.4 to 1.2, depending on the forecast source and the specifics of the estimation approach. Informal evidence suggests
that the multipliers implicitly used to generate these forecasts are about 0.5. So actual multipliers may be higher, in the range of 0.9 to 1.7.
Damit ist der IMF auch selbstkritisch. Fiskalpolitische Multiplikatoren von 0.9 bis 1.7 sind substantiell. Könnte auch mit einer Asymmetrie und der Spezifizität der Situation zu tun haben. Vielleicht haben Sparmaßnahmen einen höheren Multiplikator als expansive Fiskalpolitik?
Aber zurück zum IMF. Hier eine Darstellung der Ergebnisse. Die Prognosefehler des BIP sind deutlich negativ mit dem Sparmaßnahmen korreliert. Diese Prognosefehler finden sich wieder in den Komponenten des BIP (Investitionen, BIP und Konsum) und in der Arbeitslosenrate. Am stärksten sind sie mit den Investitionen verbunden, das zeigt deutlich die Reszession verstärkende Wirkung von fiskalischer Konsolidierung.
Keine Kommentare:
Kommentar veröffentlichen